In Miller-Davis, the plaintiff, a general contractor, filed a breach of contract claim against the defendant, a subcontractor who was hired to rebuild the roof of a YMCA swimming pool. The Plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s work failed to conform to the contract’s specifications. The plaintiff did not file a tort claims against the subcontractor. The problems with the roof were so severe that the roof had to be replaced, which is how the problem was identified.

Because the lawsuit was filed over six years after the work had been performed, there was an argument as to whether the statute of limitations for breach of contract, or the statute of repose applied. The subcontractor argued that Michigan’s statute of repose protected it from actions “to recover damages for any injury to property, real or personal, or for bodily injury or wrongful death arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property. …” Under the statute of repose, all claims must be filed within six years after occupancy. The plaintiff argued that the statute of repose did not apply because the claims were for breach of contract, not claims in tort.

Even though both statutes have six-year limitation periods, there is a significant difference between the two. Under the statute of repose, a claim accrues at the time of “occupancy of the completed improvement, use or acceptance of the improvement.” However, the statute of limitations for a breach of contract claim begins to run at the time the claim accrues.

The Michigan Supreme Court ruled that the statute of limitations for breach of contract applied because the claim was not a tort claim. The court noted that MCL 600.5839 “does not apply to a claim against an engineer or contractor for a defect in an improvement when the nature and origin of the claim is the breach of a contract.” The court ruled that the statute of repose applied only to tort actions.

The Supreme Court ruled that the claim did not fall under the statute of repose because:

There was no allegation that the roof deck system caused any “injury to property” or “bodily injury or wrongful death.” Nor was there any allegation of a “defective and unsafe condition.” Rather, plaintiff claimed that, because defendant failed to build the roof to the agreed-upon specifications, plaintiff was forced to expend money repairing it.

This case is significant because it narrows the scope of Michigan’s statute of repose exclusively to tort actions.

The Supreme Court decided the case on Application for Leave to Appeal. Rather than grant leave to appeal, the Court instead ordered that oral argument be held upon the application for leave to appeal, and reversed the Court of Appeals.

The Supreme Court essentially adopted the dissenting opinion from the Court of Appeals, ruling that although MERS did not own the mortgage note itself, MERS was “recordholder of the mortgage,” which was a sufficient “interest in the indebtedness” to satisfy the statutory requirement that the foreclosing entity be an “owner of an interest in the indebtedness.”  Essentially, the Supreme Court determined that the Court of Appeals improperly interpreted the meaning of the language of the foreclosure by advertisement statute.

This Supreme Court Order appears to definitively resolve the issue of whether MERS can foreclose a mortgage by advertisement in MERS’ name, rather than the name of the owner of the note, in the State of Michigan.

In Michigan, a property’s tax bill is calculated by multiplying the applicable millage rate by the property’s taxable value. That taxable value remains “capped;” increasing only by the lesser of the rate of inflation or 5% in any one year, until the property is “transferred.”  A transfer for property tax purpose is defined by statute. However, numerous exemptions from the definition of “transfer” exist.

In Klooster v. Charlevoix, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled that the death of a joint tenant will be exempt from being a “transfer,” leading to an uncapping of taxable value if: (a) the departing joint tenant was an “original owner;” and (b) the remaining joint tenant was a joint tenant when the joint tenancy was initially created, and has continuously remained a joint tenant. However, unless one of the new joint tenants is an “original owner,” the creation of a subsequent joint tenancy may lead to an uncapping.  To be considered an “original owner,” a joint tenant must have continuously been an owner from the date the property’s taxable value was most recently uncapped.

The Klooster decision, although heralded in the media as a “victory” for municipalities, opens up substantial planning opportunities for owners of property to structure transactions in a manner that will not lead to an uncapping of the property’s taxable value. If you are interested in learning more about such opportunities, please contact Dave Nykanen of  Demorest Law Firm.

In September 1993, voters in Detroit approved a 32.25 mill school operating property tax.  As a result, DPS was authorized to levy and collect property taxes from Detroit property owners until the millage expired on June 30, 2002.  After the expiration of the millage in 2002, DPS continued to levy the tax through 2004.  Taxpayers continued to pay the tax without objection.

In 2005, Briggs Tax Service filed a claim against DPS in the Michigan Tax Tribunal seeking a refund of the unauthorized taxes levied and collected by DPS.

The underlying issue in this case was whether the claim must be dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction (failure to timely file).  Ordinarily, the time limit to file a claim for a refund in Michigan is 35 days after a final decision. MCL 205.735(3).  Briggs did not meet this deadline and the Tax Tribunal initially dismissed Plaintiff’s claim.  The Tax Tribunal then allowed Briggs to amend its petition in order to assert a claim under MCL 211.53a, which has a three year statute of limitations.  Under MCL 211.53a, in order to assert a successful claim, the taxpayer must have been assessed and paid taxes in excess of the correct amount due to either (1) a clerical error or (2) a mutual mistake of fact by the assessing officer and the taxpayer.

There was no clerical error.  The DPS intended to levy the taxes.  Thus, in order for Briggs to successfully assert a claim under MCL 211.53a, Briggs had to prove that there was a mutual mistake of fact by both the assessing officer and the taxpayer.

The Michigan Supreme Court held that although a DPS employee certified the tax levy, a DPS employee is not the same as a tax assessor. Thus, there was no mistake by the assessing officer, because the “assessor” never certified the tax.

The Michigan Supreme Court also held that any mistake was a mistake of law, rather than a mistake of fact. The validity of a tax is a legal issue, rather than a factual issue.

While we find the result of the case somewhat surprising, the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision points out the importance of reviewing tax bills carefully, and promptly objecting to any item on the tax bill that you question.

Click here to download a PDF of the Michigan Supreme Court Opinion in Briggs Tax Service, LLC v Detroit Public Schools.

This article was written by Mark S. Demorest, Managing Member of Demorest Law Firm.

Michigan recognizes two types of joint tenancies:  (a) the standard form, which can be unilaterally severed; and (b) a joint tenancy with express words of survivorship in the granting instrument which cannot be unilaterally severed.

The recent Michigan Supreme Court of Jackson v Estate of Green, involved a dispute between two joint tenants, one of whom sought to partition the properties held by both joint tenants.  While the matter was pending before the Court, the joint tenant seeking a partition suddenly died.

The Michigan Supreme Court ruled that the joint tenancy at issue was a “standard joint tenancy” because the deed granting them a joint tenancy did not include express language identifying the parties as having a “joint tenancy with full rights of survivorship”.  As a result, the Court held that the joint tenancy could be severed by one of the parties without the consent of the others.  However, the Court also ruled that the severance occurred only upon a Court’s Order.  Merely filing a Complaint in Court did not sever the joint tenancy.  Therefore, the decedent’s estate had no interest in the subject property upon the decedent’s death.  Instead, the Court ruled that the title to the subject property vested in the surviving joint tenant immediately upon the other joint tenant’s death.

This case not only explains at what point in time a partition action severs a joint tenancy, but highlights the importance of using express words of survivorship in the granting instrument if the parties intend to secure their rights of survivorship.

This article was written by Natalie C. Najarian, Associate at Demorest Law Firm.

Among other arguments, the Plaintiffs contended that the regulation violated the common-law right of an employer to discharge an employee at will and, therefore, was void.  However, the Michigan Supreme Court rejected the argument, citing the well established case, Suchodolski v Michigan Consolidated Gas Co., and holding that an employer is not free to discharge an employee at will when the reason for the discharge contravenes public policy. 412 Mich 692, 695 (1982).

Michigan is an “employment-at-will” state.  This means that private sector employers can hire and fire employees for any reason, unless that reason is illegal.  Likewise, employees can quit for any reason.  Exceptions to this rule include when an employment contract exists or when the reason for discharge is against public policy, as was the case in McNeil v Charlevoix County.

Michigan is not one of the thirty states that has adopted smoker’s rights laws.  Therefore, while most Michigan private sector employers may be permitted to hire or fire an employee based on their smoking habits, a regulation like the one highlighted in this recent Michigan Supreme Court decision provide employees who smoke certain rights even in the at-will employment setting under the public policy exception to the Michigan at-will employment doctrine.

This article was written by Natalie C. Najarian, Associate at Demorest Law Firm. Click here to view her professional resume.

Employers should consider inserting a provision for a shortened limitations period in all employment agreements.  This can also be accomplished by adding the necessary language to the employment application or an employee handbook.  Employers will then be able to dismiss more claims as untimely at the pleading stage and ultimately save the business significant litigation expenses.