Damages Under The Anti-Lockout Statute

In Christie v Fick, a recent unpublished Michigan Court of Appeals case (March 2, 2010, No.285924), the Court was asked to review whether a tenant alleging violation of Michigan’s Anti-Lockout Statute (MCL 600.2918) was entitled to exemplary damages.

The Anti-Lockout Statute specifically states that “any tenant in possession of premises whose possessory interest has been unlawfully interfered with by the owner, lessor, licensor, or their agents shall be entitled to recover the amount of his actual damages or $200.00, whichever is greater, for each occurrence and, where possession has been lost, to recover possession.” (emphasis added).  This statute prohibits a landlord from attempting self-help eviction of a tenant, or eviction without legal process.

In Christie, plaintiff tenant filed a complaint alleging that defendant landlord unlawfully locked them out of the rental premises and also moved a large quantity of valuable equipment from the rental premises to storage, where it was subsequently damaged.  Defendants argued that the plaintiffs were behind in rent, the plaintiffs had abandoned the premises, and that plaintiffs had numerous opportunities to retrieve their personal property after it was moved.

At trial, the court gave the jury an instruction regarding the award of exemplary damages.  Specifically, the jury was instructed that “an award of exemplary damages is proper if it compensates a plaintiff for humiliation, sense of outrage, and indignity resulting from injustices maliciously, willfully, and wantonly inflicted by the defendant.”  After a jury found for plaintiffs and against defendants on plaintiffs’ claim for violation of the anti-lockout statute, MCL 600.2918, they awarded plaintiffs treble damages for the anti-lockout claim, or three times the actual damages amount.

Defendants appealed on this issue, arguing that a statutorily based cause of action will not allow for damages other than those specified in the statute.  Exemplary damages are not specifically provided for in the Anti-Lockout Statute.

Although Michigan Court of Appeals in Christie agreed with Defendants argument, it did not reverse the ruling.  The Court reasoned that, under Michigan law, recovery under the Anti-Lockout Statute may include damages for emotional distress, embarrassment, and humiliation, as part of actual damages.  Therefore, although a separate award for exemplary damages is not appropriate in a statutorily based action unless the statute in question specifically provides for such damage, damages for mental distress are allowable as part of a plaintiff’s actual damages. As a result, the Court allowed plaintiffs to recover the damages awarded as emotional distress damages under the Anti-Lockout Statute.

This article was written by Natalie C. Najarian, Associate at Demorest Law Firm.

Keeping Property Tax Values Capped Upon the Death of a Joint Tenant

Under Michigan law, a property’s taxable value is capped and may not increase by more than the rate of inflation until ownership of the property is transferred.

However, there are certain types of transfers of ownership that are exempt from this rule and will not cause an uncapping of the taxable value.  These no-transfer-of-ownership exemptions are listed in the General Property Tax Act, Section 211.27a(7).

One particular exemption that has been the subject of recent litigation in Michigan is set forth in Section 211.27a(7)(h). This exemption has to do with a transfer that creates or terminates a joint tenancy.  It has been widely assumed that the death of a joint tenant is considered a transfer that “uncaps” the taxable value of a property and is not exempt under Section 211.27a(7)(h).

However, in December 2009, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the the Michigan Tax Tribunal in the case of Klooster v City of Charlevoix, holding that the death of one joint tenant, even though it terminated the joint tenancy, was not a “conveyance” because there was no instrument that affected title.  In that case, husband and wife first acquired property, wife then quitclaimed to husband, husband then quitclaimed to himself and his son as joint tenants, and the husband/father subsequently died.  It is the death of the father as joint tenant that is the issue of the dispute.  The court disagreed with the City of Charlevoix and the Tax Tribunal’s contention that the death constituted a “transfer” under Michigan statutes.

Just this month, the Michigan Court of Appeals in Klevorn v. City of Boyne City, using Klooster as precedent and citing the similarity of the facts, held that the death of one joint tenant (mother) and the subsequent transfer the other joint tenant with rights of survivorship (son) was not a “conveyance”.  Therefore, the Court held that the property value upon transfer to the son should not have been uncapped and he was entitled to the no-transfer-of-ownership exemption in MCL 211.27a(7)(h).

The Klooster decision has been appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court.  In the meantime, there is precedent to argue that upon the death of a joint tenant, the remaining joint tenant with rights of survivorship is not subject to an uncapping of the property’s taxable value.

This article was written by Natalie C. Najarian, Associate at Demorest Law Firm.

Effective Cross Default Provisions

Many contracts have default provisions.  These provisions set forth what actions or inaction must occur for a party to default under the Agreement and for the non-defaulting party to be entitled to recover damages and/or terminate that particular Agreement.

In some circumstances, and often in the context of a loan, parties may enter into multiple agreements with one another. When there are multiple agreements between the same parties, one party may want to negotiate the inclusion of  “cross default” provisions in those agreements.  A cross default provision provides that a party’s default under one agreement triggers an automatic default of all of the other agreements between the parties. Banks or Lenders often include a cross default provision in their loan documents to protect their financial interests.  Once the cross default provision is invoked, the defaulting party is not likely to have many options for recourse.

In order to be effective, the cross default provision must be included in each of the agreements subject to the cross default. Eagle Ridge LLC v Albert Homes LLC, 2009 Mich App, LEXIS 2382 (November 17, 2009).  In the recent case of Eagle Ridge LLC v Albert Homes LLC, the Michigan Court of Appeals refused to enforce a cross default provision that was found in only one of two simultaneously signed agreements.

The Michigan Court of Appeals used basic contract principals to support its decision.  Quoting Randolph v Reisig, 272 Mich App 331 (2006), the Court found that “an unambiguous contractual provision is reflective of the parties’ intent as a matter of law, and if the language of the contract is unambiguous, we construe and enforce the contract as written.”  Therefore, because one of the agreements at issue did not contain a cross default provision, the Court concluded that the parties must not have intended that the agreement be subject to a cross default provision.

This article was written by Natalie C. Najarian, Associate at Demorest Law Firm.

Overview of the Professional Entity

In Michigan, persons in a learned profession requiring a license or other legal authorization to practice, including but not limited to, physicians, dentists, attorneys, and certified public accountants, must incorporate as a professional entity rather than a general business entity.  The choice of professional entity will depend on a variety of factors, including tax considerations.  The most popular professional entity choices are the Professional Limited Liability Company (“PLC” or “PLLC”) and the Professional Services Corporation (“PC”).

Unlike general business entities, there are certain restrictions on Professional Entities.  Both Professional Corporations and Professional Limited Liability Companies are required to operate for the specific purpose of providing one or more professional services.

Generally, all shareholders of the Professional Corporation or members or managers of the Professional Limited Liability must be licensed persons in one or more of the professional services the Professional Entity renders. However, persons in certain professions must comply with additional requirements when structuring their professional entity.  For example, all of the members or shareholders of certain health and legal professional entities must hold the same professional license.

A shareholder or member that wants to transfer or sell his or her shares or membership interests cannot do so except to another licensed person who is eligible to be a member of the PC or PLC.

Another important aspect of the professional entity is that it provides protection to its shareholders and members from personal liability for the PLC or PC’s acts, debts or other obligations.  However, the professional shareholder or member may still be personally liable under common law for his or her negligence or malpractice, or the malpractice of others under the member or shareholder’s direct supervision and control.

This article was written by Natalie C. Najarian, Associate at Demorest Law Firm.

What Are A Dual Real Estate Agent’s Duties to the Buyer or Seller?

When purchasing or selling real property in Michigan, parties often rely on their real estate agent to guide them through the process with their best interests in mind.  However, this is only true of the buyer only agent or seller only agent.  A dual agent, who represents both the buyer and seller in a transaction, does not owe its clients the same fiduciary duties that a buyer only agent or seller only agent would be required to provide.  In fact, under Michigan law, dual agents have only the duty to provide services to complete a real estate transaction.  (MCL 339.2517).

This rule is clear in the recent Michigan Court of Appeals case, Vanhellemont v Gleason, et al (Click here for a PDF of the unpublished decision). The Court in this case looked to the terms of the parties’ Purchase Agreement and the Dual Agency Agreement and held that the dual agent not only complied with her duties under the Dual Agency Agreement by simply completing the transaction, but she would have been in violation of her duties under the Dual Agency Agreement had she drafted either a buyer-oriented or a seller-oriented agreement.

Therefore, a buyer or a seller that agrees to a dual agency relationship with their real estate agent is also agreeing, unless stated otherwise in writing, to be responsible for understanding and approving the terms of the purchase and sale agreement that they sign.  The dual agent will only ensure that the transaction in completed according to the terms of the purchase and sale agreement.

This article was written by Natalie C. Najarian, Associate at Demorest Law Firm.

Broadening the State Real Estate Transfer Tax

When real property is transferred in the state of Michigan, both state and county transfer taxes are assessed based on the purchase price of the property.  Transfer taxes are imposed when a deed transferred the ownership of land from one entity to another.  However, until recently, the transfer tax did not apply if the buyer simply bought the entity that owned the land.  This was perceived as a loophole for single-purpose real estate entities to avoid paying the transfer tax.

On January 9, 2009, the State Real Estate Transfer Tax Act (MCL 207.521, et seq.) was amended to impose the state real estate transfer tax (“SRETT”) on transfers of a “controlling interest” in an entity, if the entity has 90% or more of its value in real estate. “Controlling interest” is defined to include ownership of 80% of the stock of a corporation, or 80% of the membership interests of a limited liability company.

The amended Act includes the same exemptions as the original SRETT statute, but adds new exemptions for (i) transfers made to effectuate a dissolution of the corporation, limited liability company, partnership or trust, and (ii) transfers from an entity to another where the ownership remains the same.

The amendments do not apply to the county property transfer tax. Therefore, an entity purchase still does not trigger an obligation to pay the county transfer tax.

This article was written by Natalie C. Najarian, Associate at Demorest Law Firm.

Jackson v Estate of Green: The Effect of a Partition Action on a Joint Tenancy

Joint tenants hold equal and undivided interests in a parcel, with a right of survivorship. When a joint tenant dies, the deceased’s interest does not descend to heirs. Instead, the entire ownership remains in the surviving joint tenant or tenants.  This transfer occurs automatically upon the death of the joint tenant.

Michigan recognizes two types of joint tenancies:  (a) the standard form, which can be unilaterally severed; and (b) a joint tenancy with express words of survivorship in the granting instrument which cannot be unilaterally severed.

The recent Michigan Supreme Court of Jackson v Estate of Green, involved a dispute between two joint tenants, one of whom sought to partition the properties held by both joint tenants.  While the matter was pending before the Court, the joint tenant seeking a partition suddenly died.

The Michigan Supreme Court ruled that the joint tenancy at issue was a “standard joint tenancy” because the deed granting them a joint tenancy did not include express language identifying the parties as having a “joint tenancy with full rights of survivorship”.  As a result, the Court held that the joint tenancy could be severed by one of the parties without the consent of the others.  However, the Court also ruled that the severance occurred only upon a Court’s Order.  Merely filing a Complaint in Court did not sever the joint tenancy.  Therefore, the decedent’s estate had no interest in the subject property upon the decedent’s death.  Instead, the Court ruled that the title to the subject property vested in the surviving joint tenant immediately upon the other joint tenant’s death.

This case not only explains at what point in time a partition action severs a joint tenancy, but highlights the importance of using express words of survivorship in the granting instrument if the parties intend to secure their rights of survivorship.

This article was written by Natalie C. Najarian, Associate at Demorest Law Firm.

McNeil v Charlevoix County: An Exception to Michigan’s Employment At-Will Doctrine

On July 21, 2009, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled in McNeil v Charlevoix County, 2009 Mich. LEXIS 1572, that a local health agency had the authority to require employers to adhere to a more strict regulation regarding workplace smoking than was required under state law. In addition, the Court ruled that (a) the local regulation gave employees a private right of action to seek the regulation’s enforcement and prohibit employers from retaliating against the employee, and (b) the local regulation prohibited an employer from discharging, refusing to hire, or otherwise retaliating against an employee for exercising his or her rights under the regulation.

Among other arguments, the Plaintiffs contended that the regulation violated the common-law right of an employer to discharge an employee at will and, therefore, was void.  However, the Michigan Supreme Court rejected the argument, citing the well established case, Suchodolski v Michigan Consolidated Gas Co., and holding that an employer is not free to discharge an employee at will when the reason for the discharge contravenes public policy. 412 Mich 692, 695 (1982).

Michigan is an “employment-at-will” state.  This means that private sector employers can hire and fire employees for any reason, unless that reason is illegal.  Likewise, employees can quit for any reason.  Exceptions to this rule include when an employment contract exists or when the reason for discharge is against public policy, as was the case in McNeil v Charlevoix County.

Michigan is not one of the thirty states that has adopted smoker’s rights laws.  Therefore, while most Michigan private sector employers may be permitted to hire or fire an employee based on their smoking habits, a regulation like the one highlighted in this recent Michigan Supreme Court decision provide employees who smoke certain rights even in the at-will employment setting under the public policy exception to the Michigan at-will employment doctrine.

This article was written by Natalie C. Najarian, Associate at Demorest Law Firm. Click here to view her professional resume.

Michigan Leads the Way With a New Corporate Form – The L3C

As of January 2009, Michigan is one of the few states to offer a new form of business entity.  If your business is for profit, but its primary focus is to accomplish socially beneficial acts, you may want to organize as a low profit limited liability, or an L3C.

The L3C is structured like any other limited liability company, with all the flexibility and advantages of a normal limited liability company, including being treated as a “pass through” entity for federal tax purposes.  However, the L3C must satisfy certain criteria to prove that its main goal is not to make a profit.

L3C’s are designed to qualify as a recipient of Program-Related Investments, or PRIs.  PRIs are IRS-sanctioned investments made by private foundations to support a charitable project or activity.  As a result of their charitable purpose, PRIs receive special treatment under federal tax law.

Historically, foundations have been reluctant to invest in for-profit businesses through the use of PRIs because of complex and costly IRS requirements to do so.  The L3C removes many of these hurdles and costs.

Hopefully, the L3C will make it easier for foundations to invest in Michigan’s community and economic revitalization.

This article was written by Natalie C. Najarian, Associate at Demorest Law Firm. Click here to view her professional resume.

What You Need to Know About the Bullard Plawecki Employee Right to Know Act

Under the Bullard Plawecki Employee Right to Know Act, employees are entitled to review their personnel records, make copies of those records, and file written statements clarifying or protesting any documents contained in their file. An employer’s use and disclosure of employee records are regulated by this Act as well.

The following are some of the important provisions of the Employee Right to Know Act that every employer should be aware of:

(1) Employers must make the personnel records of both current and former employees available to those employees upon written request, but not more than 2 times per year.

(2) Not all records are considered “personnel records” available for review by the employee.  Only records kept and used by an employer in determining an employer’s qualifications for employment, promotions, transfers, additional compensation, or disciplinary action must be available to employee for review.  Records that are not required to be open for review include, but are not limited to:  employee references, employee medical records if available to employee by other means, personal information regarding a third party which could be an invasion of privacy, and documents related to employer staffing plans.

(3) Employers may charge that employee for reasonable copying charges.

(4) If an employee disputes any of the information contained in his or her personnel file, the employee is entitled to submit a written statement explaining his or her position.  If either employer or employee knowingly put false information in the personnel file, legal action may be taken to remove such false information.

(5) An employer is prohibited from using in a judicial proceeding any personnel record information which was intentionally not included in the personnel record, but should have been as required by the Act.

(6) Any violation of the Employee Right to Know Act by an employer is grounds for a civil lawsuit.  A court may order the employer to comply with the statute and award an employee damages, including reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.

This article was written by Natalie C. Najarian, Associate at Demorest Law Firm. Click here to view her professional resume.