Damages Under The Anti-Lockout Statute

In Christie v Fick, a recent unpublished Michigan Court of Appeals case (March 2, 2010, No.285924), the Court was asked to review whether a tenant alleging violation of Michigan’s Anti-Lockout Statute (MCL 600.2918) was entitled to exemplary damages.

The Anti-Lockout Statute specifically states that “any tenant in possession of premises whose possessory interest has been unlawfully interfered with by the owner, lessor, licensor, or their agents shall be entitled to recover the amount of his actual damages or $200.00, whichever is greater, for each occurrence and, where possession has been lost, to recover possession.” (emphasis added).  This statute prohibits a landlord from attempting self-help eviction of a tenant, or eviction without legal process.

In Christie, plaintiff tenant filed a complaint alleging that defendant landlord unlawfully locked them out of the rental premises and also moved a large quantity of valuable equipment from the rental premises to storage, where it was subsequently damaged.  Defendants argued that the plaintiffs were behind in rent, the plaintiffs had abandoned the premises, and that plaintiffs had numerous opportunities to retrieve their personal property after it was moved.

At trial, the court gave the jury an instruction regarding the award of exemplary damages.  Specifically, the jury was instructed that “an award of exemplary damages is proper if it compensates a plaintiff for humiliation, sense of outrage, and indignity resulting from injustices maliciously, willfully, and wantonly inflicted by the defendant.”  After a jury found for plaintiffs and against defendants on plaintiffs’ claim for violation of the anti-lockout statute, MCL 600.2918, they awarded plaintiffs treble damages for the anti-lockout claim, or three times the actual damages amount.

Defendants appealed on this issue, arguing that a statutorily based cause of action will not allow for damages other than those specified in the statute.  Exemplary damages are not specifically provided for in the Anti-Lockout Statute.

Although Michigan Court of Appeals in Christie agreed with Defendants argument, it did not reverse the ruling.  The Court reasoned that, under Michigan law, recovery under the Anti-Lockout Statute may include damages for emotional distress, embarrassment, and humiliation, as part of actual damages.  Therefore, although a separate award for exemplary damages is not appropriate in a statutorily based action unless the statute in question specifically provides for such damage, damages for mental distress are allowable as part of a plaintiff’s actual damages. As a result, the Court allowed plaintiffs to recover the damages awarded as emotional distress damages under the Anti-Lockout Statute.

This article was written by Natalie C. Najarian, Associate at Demorest Law Firm.

Attorney’s Signature Creates Binding Settlement

You might think that the settlement of a lawsuit requires the signature of the client.  That is not the case under this Michigan Court Rules.   A settlement may be enforced if (a) it is agreed to before the Judge in open court on the record by the client or attorney or (b) if there is “written evidence” of the settlement signed by the client or attorney.  MCR 2.507(G0.

In Kennedy v Hayduk, the plaintiff’s attorney claimed that a settlement had not been reached.  The Michigan Court of Appeals disagreed.  The defense attorney sent a letter summarizing the terms of a proposed settlement.  There were more detailed settlement documents still to be prepared.  The plaintiff’s attorney then signed and returned to the defense attorney a stipulation and order to dismiss the case.  The plaintiff later argued that there were terms of the settlement that had not been agreed upon, so there was no binding settlement.    The Court of Appeals ruled that: “The signed stipulation was unconditional acceptance of defendants’ offer. … The objective evidence shows that an agreement was reached.”

A lesson from this case:  Don’t sign a settlement until all terms have been agreed upon.

Download a PDF of the decision by clicking here.

This article was written by Mark S. Demorest, Managing Member of Demorest Law Firm.

CARD Act – How the New Credit Card Law Works

The Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility, and Disclosure Act of 2009 (or “CARD Act”) went into effect on Monday, February 22.  The purpose of this Act was to prevent credit card companies from using predatory lending practices and excessive penalties for credit card customers.  Note, however, that the CARD Act only applies to personal credit cards, not business credit cards.

Key provisions of the CARD Act include:

• Interest rates on existing balances cannot be changed unless (1) your payment is 60 or more days late; or (2) you have an introductory rate that expires.
• If a payment is more then 60 days late, but your payments for the next 6 months are all on-time, the credit card company must reduce your interest rate back to the original rate.
• Interest rates on new purchases can be changed, but the credit card company must give you 45 days notice before raising your rate.  You can opt out of the rate change, but that means your account will be closed and you will have five years to pay off the existing balance at the existing interest rate.  There are some exceptions to this rule, however.  For example, if you have a variable rate card tied to the prime rate, this provision does not apply.
• Credit card companies can no longer use the “universal default” provision that some were using.  If you pay late or default on any account (credit card, utility, etc.), other card issuers can no longer raise your interest rate on your existing balance on those cards.
• Credit card companies can no longer approve a charge that exceeds your limit and then charge you an over-limit fee and penalty interest rate.  Beware of “opt-in” offers to avoid over-limit fees, as this is a scam.
• You cannot be charged for paying online, by mail, or over the phone, unless you speak to a live operator and then they must disclose the fee before you pay.
• Payment due dates must be the same every month, and if the due date falls on a holiday or weekend, the payment is due the next business day.
• Your bill must now disclose how long it will take to pay off the current balance if you only pay the minimum amount each month, as well as the total amount of principal and interest you would pay over that time period.
• Anyone under 21 cannot get a credit card without either (1) proof of income to pay the bills or (2) an adult co-signer.

One problem with the CARD Act, however, is that it was signed into law in May 2009, but did not become effective until this week.  This gave credit card companies significant time to find ways around the new laws, including cutting credit limits and raising interest rates before the restrictions on such practices went into effect.  Some other new negative practices include:

• Closing accounts or charging fees for inactivity or even for “low activity”
• The return of annual fees to many cards – even if you have never had an annual fee on a particular card, there is nothing to stop the card issuer from charging one now
• Converting fixed rate cards to variable rate cards, and setting these rates with a floor that they will never fall below
• Redefining terms of certain fees, such as what is considered an “international transaction”
• Increasing balance transfer fees and cash advance fees
• Adding fees for paper statements
• Changing the terms of rewards programs or eliminating such programs altogether
• Stricter review of who is issued credit
• Reducing credit limits without warning

Pay attention to all correspondence from your credit card company, and if they are acting in a way that should be covered by the CARD Act, call and complain.  If that doesn’t work, contact your US Senator or Representative.

This article was written by Melissa L. Demorest, Associate at Demorest Law Firm.

To Quality as a Future Advance Mortgage, Correct Language Must By Included in the Recorded Mortgage

A mortgage has priority over other liens on the property from the date it is recorded with the Register of Deeds. The mortgage can also have priority for amounts advanced by the lender after the date of recording if the mortgage contains certain specific language making it a “future advance mortgage”. In Citizens State Bank v. Nakash (2010), the Michigan Court of Appeals considered what happens when a recorded mortgage references a promissory note or agreement that contains the future advance language, but the recorded mortgage itself contains no future advance language. The Court of Appeals ruled that the mortgage creates no priority for future advances by the lender when the promissory note or agreement containing the future advance language is unrecorded. MCL 565.901(b) holds that the instrument creating a future advance mortgage must be recorded. This ruling makes sense, because the recorded mortgage should put other parties on notice that it is a future advance mortgage, and not merely refer to another document that is not part of the chain of title.

To download a PDF of the case click here.

This article was written by Mark S. Demorest, Managing Member of Demorest Law Firm.

Don’t Sign the Satisfaction Unless You’re Satisfied

The Michigan Court of Appeals recently reaffirmed the Michigan Common Law that when a plaintiff enters into a release and provides an accord and satisfaction to settle a lawsuit, that if the plaintiff seeks to later repudiate the accord and satisfaction, he or she must return all the money that was paid by the defendant originally to settle the suit before a new suit may be commenced.    An accord and satisfaction is more than a release of a claim. An accord and satisfaction requires that the claim be disputed and the substituted performance be agreed upon and accomplished.

In the case decided by the Michigan Court of Appeals, the plaintiff purchased a manufactured home from the defendant.   Soon after the plaintiff took possession, she discovered several serious defects and sued the defendant.    The parties reached an out-of-court settlement, wherein the defendant agreed to repair all the various defects and pay plaintiff and her attorney $8,500.  After the repairs were made, plaintiff inspected the repairs with her attorney and signed off on them, signing both a release and satisfaction.

A year later, plaintiff discovered high levels of toxic mold, later filing suit against the same defendant arguing that the defendant breached the settlement agreement by not completing the original repairs in a workmanlike manner.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s holding that nothing prevented the plaintiff from having a professional inspect the defendant’s work before she signed the original satisfaction.   Just because the mold was not visible to the naked eye does not mean the satisfaction does not cover it.    Thus, plaintiff’s second lawsuit was an attempt to repudiate the release that she gave defendants originally.    The Court held that because plaintiff signed the release and satisfaction, and because defendants made the repairs and paid her, the contract was complete.    The Court held because plaintiff was attempting to repudiate the release she must give back the consideration before filing suit.    If she had not signed the satisfaction, she could have filed suit without having to return the money first.

Click here to download a PDF copy of the Michigan Court of Appeals Decision in Bain v Community Sales.

This article was written by Michael R. Dorfman, Senior Associate at Demorest Law Firm.

Separate Appeal of Attorney’s Fees and Costs

The Michigan Court of Appeals decided an interesting procedural issue regarding the appeal of post-judgment orders awarding or denying attorney’s fees. In Mossing v. Demlow Products, Inc. (2010), the trial court denied an award of attorney’s fees and costs to the defendants.  This occurred after the plaintiff had already filed an appeal, and the defendants had already filed a cross-appeal, in the Court of Appeals. In their cross-appeal, the defendants seek to have that fee order reversed. The Court of Appeals ruled that a completely separate appeal must be taken from the post-judgment order. In other words, the appeal cannot be tacked on to the cross-appeal; it must stand alone as a separate appeal.

Click here to download a PDF of the Court of Appeals decision in Mossing v Demlow.

This article was written by Mark S. Demorest, Managing Member of Demorest Law Firm.

2009 Federal Tax Benefit for Qualifying Contributions for Haitian Earthquake Relief

The Internal Revenue Service is making a one-time, extraordinary allowance to taxpayers who make qualifying contributions for Haitian earthquake relief.[1]

Individual taxpayers who itemize their deductions for 2009 may deduct on their 2009 income tax return cash contributions to qualifying charities for Haitian earthquake relief made after January 11, 2010 and before March 1, 2010.  A “qualifying charity” for this purpose is a charity which is (1) based in the United States, and (2) is either (a) listed in IRS Publication 78 or (b) a bona fide church.

Publication 78 lists charities which have applied for, and been granted, IRS recognition that contributions to them are deductible as charitable contributions for Federal income tax purposes.  An online version of Publication 78 can be found at http://www.irs.gov/app/pub-78/.

To designate that a contribution is for Haitian earthquake relief, you should specify on the memo line of the check or otherwise in the documentation for the contribution that the contribution is for Haitian earthquake relief.

If you have any question about making a qualifying contribution, please feel free to contact us.

[1] IR 2010-12, Jan. 25, 2010.

This article was written by Stephen J. Dunn, Of Counsel to Demorest Law Firm.

Keeping Property Tax Values Capped Upon the Death of a Joint Tenant

Under Michigan law, a property’s taxable value is capped and may not increase by more than the rate of inflation until ownership of the property is transferred.

However, there are certain types of transfers of ownership that are exempt from this rule and will not cause an uncapping of the taxable value.  These no-transfer-of-ownership exemptions are listed in the General Property Tax Act, Section 211.27a(7).

One particular exemption that has been the subject of recent litigation in Michigan is set forth in Section 211.27a(7)(h). This exemption has to do with a transfer that creates or terminates a joint tenancy.  It has been widely assumed that the death of a joint tenant is considered a transfer that “uncaps” the taxable value of a property and is not exempt under Section 211.27a(7)(h).

However, in December 2009, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the the Michigan Tax Tribunal in the case of Klooster v City of Charlevoix, holding that the death of one joint tenant, even though it terminated the joint tenancy, was not a “conveyance” because there was no instrument that affected title.  In that case, husband and wife first acquired property, wife then quitclaimed to husband, husband then quitclaimed to himself and his son as joint tenants, and the husband/father subsequently died.  It is the death of the father as joint tenant that is the issue of the dispute.  The court disagreed with the City of Charlevoix and the Tax Tribunal’s contention that the death constituted a “transfer” under Michigan statutes.

Just this month, the Michigan Court of Appeals in Klevorn v. City of Boyne City, using Klooster as precedent and citing the similarity of the facts, held that the death of one joint tenant (mother) and the subsequent transfer the other joint tenant with rights of survivorship (son) was not a “conveyance”.  Therefore, the Court held that the property value upon transfer to the son should not have been uncapped and he was entitled to the no-transfer-of-ownership exemption in MCL 211.27a(7)(h).

The Klooster decision has been appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court.  In the meantime, there is precedent to argue that upon the death of a joint tenant, the remaining joint tenant with rights of survivorship is not subject to an uncapping of the property’s taxable value.

This article was written by Natalie C. Najarian, Associate at Demorest Law Firm.

Religion and Civil Rights Act Exception

The Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (“CRA”), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, etc., does not apply to “ministerial” employees of religious organizations.  The Michigan Court of Appeals recently ruled that if an employee’s position can be characterized as ministerial, then this employee falls under the ministerial exception and cannot file a discrimination or retaliation claim under the CRA.  In Weishuhn v. Catholic Diocese of Lansing (2010), a teacher filed a claim under the CRA for retaliatory discharge. The plaintiff was a teacher at a Catholic school, and taught more mathematics classes than religious classes. However, because her duties at the school included religious activities, and because she admitted to incorporating religion into everything she taught, her position was found by the Court of Appeals to be ministerial in nature. As a result, a complaint could not be sustained under the CRA. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of her lawsuit.

Click here for a PDF copy of the Court’s Decision.

This article was written by Mark S. Demorest, Managing Member of Demorest Law Firm.

When is a License Fee Really an Illegal Tax?

Faced with tighter budgets, Michigan cities and townships are looking for additional ways to raise revenue.  Due to the Headlee Amendment, property tax increases are severely restricted.   However, a municipality may establish or increase a fee without violating the Headlee Amendment.  The question is:  Where is the dividing line between a permissible fee and an illegal tax increase?

A tax is solely to raise revenue.   A permissible fee (typically a permit or license fee) has three characteristics: (a) the fee serves a regulatory purpose; (b) the amount of the fee is proportionate to the necessary costs for the municipality to provide that service, and (c) payment of the fee is voluntary.

Several years ago, we were involved in litigation that resulted in the Wayne County Circuit Court declaring a license fee imposed by Sumpter Township illegal.  The Court decided that the fee for a sand excavation license was really being used by the Township to discourage additional landfills from being located in the Township, and that the amount of the fee was excessive in relationship to the Township’s costs to regulate and inspect sand excavation sites.  The Ordinance was set aside.

On January 21, 2010, the Michigan Court of Appeals issued its decision in Wolf v City of Detroit.    The plaintiff claimed that a new Solid Waste Inspection Fee adopted by the City of Detroit was really just a disguised tax.  The inspection fee was imposed on properties that did not use the City’s Department of Public Works for solid waste pick-up.  The Court of Appeals analyzed the three criteria for a fee and decided that the fee was permissible.   A copy of the Court of Appeals’ decision is attached.

Whenever a municipality imposes a new fee, or dramatically increases the amount of a fee, then one should analyze whether the three criteria for a fee are met.  If not, the fee may be challenged as a hidden tax.

Click here to download a PDF copy of the Court of Appeals Decision.

This article was written by Mark S. Demorest, Managing Member of Demorest Law Firm.